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WOMEN IN THE LEGAL ACADEMY:  A BRIEF 
HISTORY OF FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 
Robin West* 
INTRODUCTION 
Women’s entry into the legal academy in significant numbers—first as 
students, then as faculty—was a 1970s and 1980s phenomenon.1  During 
those decades, women in law schools struggled:  first, for admission and 
inclusion as individual students on a formally equal footing with male 
students; then for parity in their numbers in classes and on faculties; and, 
eventually, for some measure of substantive equality across various 
parameters, including their performance and evaluation both in and in front 
of the classroom, as well as in the quality of their experiences as students and 
faculty members and in the benefits to be reaped from their tenure.2  This 
 
*  Frederick J. Haas Professor of Law and Philosophy and Faculty Director, SJD Program, 
Georgetown University Law Center.  This Article was prepared for the Symposium entitled 
Legal Education in Twentieth-Century America, held at New York University’s Villa La Pietra 
conference center in Florence, Italy, on July 2–4, 2018.  For an overview of the Symposium, 
see Matthew Diller, Foreword:  Legal Education in Twentieth-Century America, 87 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 859 (2018). 
 
 1. See FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE:  CASES AND MATERIALS 961 (Cynthia Grant Bowman 
et al. eds., 4th ed. 2011).  For a history of women’s entry into the legal profession, see generally 
CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW (2d ed. 1993), and KAREN BERGER MORELLO, THE 
INVISIBLE BAR:  THE WOMAN LAWYER IN AMERICA:  1638 TO THE PRESENT 210–17 (1986).  For 
a history of women at Harvard Law School and Harvard’s refusal to admit women until the 
1950s, see DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE & BRUCE A. KIMBALL, ON THE BATTLEFIELD OF MERIT: 
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, THE FIRST CENTURY 478–99 (2015). 
 2. FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE:  CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 1, at 961–79; see also 
EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 62–67; MORELLO, supra note 1, at 103–05.  There is now a sizeable 
literature on the differences between women’s experiences of law school and men’s, from the 
1970s to the present.  For an early account, see Alice D. Jacobs, Women in Law School:  
Structural Constraint and Personal Choice in the Formation of Professional Identity, 24 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 462, 470 (1972).  For studies that are school specific, see, for example, 
WORKING GRP. ON STUDENT EXPERIENCES, HARVARD LAW SCH., STUDY ON WOMEN’S 
EXPERIENCES AT HARVARD LAW SCHOOL (2004), https://web.archive.org/ 
web/20180422223356/http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/experiences/FullReport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V5Z9-3FYX]; Taunya Lovell Banks, Gender Bias in the Classroom, 38 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 137 (1988) (reporting on an empirical study of, among other differences, 
patterns of participation in the classroom); Allison L. Bowers, Women at the University of 
Texas School of Law:  A Call for Action, 9 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 117 (2000); Celestial S. D. 
Cassman & Lisa R. Pruitt, A Kinder, Gentler Law School?  Race, Ethnicity, Gender, and Legal 
Education at King Hall, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1209 (2005); Marsha Garrison et al., 
Succeeding in Law School:  A Comparison of Women’s Experiences at Brooklyn Law School 
and the University of Pennsylvania, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 515 (1996); and Joan M. 
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part of the story of women’s entry into the legal academy in the 1970s and 
1980s—a story of attempted admission, then inclusion, then integration and 
assimilation, and then, finally, equality—is now a familiar one, at least in 
broad outline.  It is not, in its entirety, an uplifting story.  According to a raft 
of articles produced by women law students in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, 
women law students during those decades participated less in the classroom, 
were called on and responded to differently when they did participate, 
suffered from more law-school-induced anxiety disorders and other mental 
health issues, graduated with lower GPAs and less law review experience, 
published fewer notes and filled fewer editorial positions on those journals, 
held fewer leadership positions overall while in law school, and had far more 
difficulties connecting with mentors, teachers, and would-be recommenders 
among the faculty than male students.3  Women law professors during those 
decades were tenured at significantly lower rates than men and, particularly 
at high prestige schools and at schools with fewer female faculty among the 
tenured ranks, were hired at lower rates that did not reflect their number in 
the pool of qualified applicants,4 had trouble asserting or maintaining 
authority in the classroom or being perceived as having authority, taught 
lower-prestige courses and received low teaching evaluations, and, like their 
students, were published far less frequently in the major and most prestigious 
law reviews.5 
 
Krauskopf, Touching the Elephant:  Perceptions of Gender Issues in Nine Law Schools, 44 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 311, 314 (1994).  For what may be the most extensive empirical study, see Lani 
Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen:  Women’s Experiences at One Ivy League Law School, 
143 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1994). 
 3. Yale Law School women have been the most forthcoming about their experiences.  
For contemporaneous accounts of women at Yale in the 1980s, see generally Catherine Weiss 
& Louise Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1299 (1988).  
For descriptions of the experiences of women at Yale in the 1990s, see Paula Gaber, “Just 
Trying to Be Human in This Place”:  The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 10 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 165 (1998), and for an account of women law students at Yale in the 2000s, see Sari 
Bashi & Maryana Iskander, Why Legal Education Is Failing Women, 18 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 389 (2006). 
 4. For an analysis of the statistics from the 1970s and 1980s, see Richard H. Chused, The 
Hiring and Retention of Minorities and Women on American Law School Faculties, 137 U. 
PA. L. REV. 537 (1988), which reviews the past fifteen years of hiring and retention rates of 
women on law faculty, with a focus on high-prestige, laggard schools with far fewer women 
than men; for analysis of the statistics from the 1990s, see Richard K. Neumann Jr., Women 
in Legal Education:  What the Statistics Show, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313, 337 (2000), which 
shows that the tenure divide worsened during the nineties; for analysis of the numbers that 
includes the 2000s, see FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE:  CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 1, at 
975–79.  For a study of the gender divisions by subject area, with women in less prestigious 
and lower-paying fields, see Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Rooms of Their Own:  An Empirical 
Study of Occupational Segregation by Gender Among Law Professors, 73 UMKC L. REV. 293 
(2004). 
 5. For early discussions of women’s experiences as faculty in the classroom, see Marina 
Angel, Women in Legal Education:  What It’s Like to Be Part of a Perpetual First Wave or 
the Case of the Disappearing Women, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 799 (1988).  On student evaluations, 
see Deborah J. Merritt, Bias, the Brain, and Student Evaluations of Teaching, 82 ST. JOHN’S 
L. REV. 235 (2008).  On course assignments, see Ann C. McGinley, Reproducing Gender on 
Law School Faculties, 2009 BYU L. REV. 99, and on rates of publication in law reviews, see 
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Much of this, albeit not all, has not changed much for either students or 
faculty.6  As women in law schools enter the posttenure and midcareer phase, 
many of the old problems persist while new ones appear:  women faculty are 
invited to participate on panels less often than men, and both women students 
and faculty are underrepresented as authors in law reviews.7  Although 
gender-neutral parental leave is now available to faculty at most law schools, 
many such policies are still ad hoc.  There is considerable worry, although 
no hard evidence, over whether men disproportionately use the time off to 
write rather than care for children.8  Women are still disproportionately 
overrepresented in some fields and underrepresented or unrepresented in 
others, and those fields correlate in unsurprising ways with levels of prestige:  
the more women in a field, the less prestigious.9  As elsewhere in the 
workforce, women faculty in legal education suffer from sexual harassment, 
most of which is unremedied.10  Women still suffer a pay gap in law schools 
that remains unaddressed at most universities, as it does elsewhere in 
 
Jonathan Gingerich, A Call for Blind Review:  Student Edited Law Reviews and Bias, 59 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 269 (2009). 
 6. There is a vast literature on how women faculty in law schools are faring.  For 
excellent general discussion and survey of the literature, in addition to the authorities cited 
supra in note 5, see Herma Hill Kay, The Future of Women Law Professors, 77 IOWA L. REV. 
5, 8–10 (1991); Laura T. Kessler, Paid Family Leave in American Law Schools:  Findings and 
Open Questions, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 661, 662–65 (2006), and see also Edward S. Adams & 
Samuel P. Engel, Gender Diversity and Disparity in the Legal Profession:  An Empirical 
Analysis of the Gender Profile in National Law Firms and Law Schools, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 
1211, 1211–13 (2015); Hannah Brenner, Expanding the Pathways to Gender Equality in the 
Legal Profession, 17 LEGAL ETHICS 261 (2014); and Paula A. Monopoli, Gender and the 
Crisis in Legal Education:  Remaking the Academy in Our Image, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
1745. 
 7. Bridget Crawford, Are You Willing to Ask About the Diversity of an Academic Panel 
Before Accepting a Speaking Invitation?, FEMINIST L. PROFESSORS BLOG (May 31, 2018), 
http://www.feministlawprofessors.com/2018/05/are-you-willing-to-ask-about-the-diversity-
of-an-academic-panel-before-accepting-a-speaking-invitation/ [https://perma.cc/7SZP-
PHKP] (discussing the makeup of panels, and calling for all faculty members to inquire about 
the diversity efforts before committing to being on a panel); see also Nancy Leong, Discursive 
Disparities, 8 FIU L. REV. 369, 373 (2013) (discussing disparities in authorship of articles and 
notes). 
 8. See generally Kessler, supra note 6.  One study of family leave in universities found 
plenty of anecdotal complaints about men using parental leave to advance careerist aims but 
no hard evidence of fathers “shirking” use of parental leave by employing nannies or relying 
on spouses or partners. See Jennifer H. Lundquist et al., Parental Leave Usage by Fathers and 
Mothers at an American University, 10 FATHERING 337, 341–42 (2012).  Older studies make 
clear how far law schools have come in providing family leave for faculty members. See 
generally Richard H. Chused, Faculty Parenthood:  Law School Treatment of Pregnancy and 
Child Care, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 568 (1985); Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave, 72 
TEX. L. REV. 1047 (1994). 
 9. See Kornhauser, supra note 4, at 310–12 (describing a study that found that women 
law professors are clustered in lower-prestige fields). 
 10. See generally Yxta Maya Murray, Draft of a Letter of Recommendation to the 
Honorable Alex Kozinski, Which I Guess I’m Not Going to Send Now, 25 MICH. J. GENDER & 
L. 59 (2018) (commenting on sexual harassment of law clerks). 
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academia.11  There is a sizeable literature on these depressing phenomena 
that stubbornly do not seem to abate. 
In these comments, however, I want to focus on another, less appreciated, 
part of the story of women’s entry into the legal academy in the 1970s and 
1980s:  the emergence of a body of scholarship—sometimes called feminist 
legal theory—produced by some of these women legal scholars over the same 
time period.  The story I want to focus on, in other words, is not that of 
second- or third-wave women’s struggles within the academy, either for 
admission, acceptance, assimilation, or equality in law schools.  Rather, this 
Article focuses on the story of the scholarship some of those second-wave 
assimilated women produced once they got there.  Feminist jurisprudence, 
understood largely as scholarship on issues pertaining to gender equality, was 
launched in the 1970s, endures today, and continues to shape debates.12  
Feminist legal theory, however, was in effect a subfield within feminist 
jurisprudence and, as its name implies, was an attempt to fashion a broad-
based theoretical account of the relationship of law in liberal legal regimes 
to women’s subordination, patriarchy, and gender and sexual inequality—
particularly in a post–civil rights era, when women enjoyed broad access to 
rights of formal equality, reproductive liberty, and liberal antidiscrimination 
law.13  Feminist legal theory so understood—a body of scholarship in search 
of a theoretical understanding of the relation of law to women’s 
subordination or, more simply, of law and patriarchy—was birthed in the 
 
 11. For a general discussion of the pay gap in academia, see Debra A. Barbezat & James 
W. Hughes, Salary Structure Effects and the Gender Pay Gap in Academia, 46 RES. HIGHER 
EDUC. 621 (2005). 
 12. The premise of early scholarship, casebooks, and courses on feminist jurisprudence 
was that law’s differential treatment of women was far more harmful to women’s interests 
than widely believed, thereby laying the groundwork for the demand for formal equality that 
dominated the liberal feminism that followed.  By the late 1980s, however, major feminists in 
various doctrinal areas were also sounding cultural, intersectional, and radical feminist 
themes.  For some major early contributions in this evolution, see, for example, Leslie Bender, 
A Lawyer’s Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3 (1988) (providing an 
overview of feminist tort scholarship); Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986); Martha 
L. Fineman, Implementing Equality:  Ideology, Contradiction and Social Change, 1983 WIS. 
L. REV. 789; Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory:  A Way Out of the Maternity 
and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1986) (addressing and redefining the 
problem of difference in the workplace); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy 
and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985) (questioning the privacy 
rationale of Roe v. Wade); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. 
REV. 955 (1984); and Wendy Williams, Equality’s Riddle:  Pregnancy and the Equal 
Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325 (1984) 
(defending the equal-treatment approach to pregnancy in the workplace). 
 13. The major figure in this development was unquestionably Catharine MacKinnon.  Her 
early writings were the most embracing, as well as the most bracing, seeking an explanation 
of women’s subordination to men in legal systems worldwide and locating the expropriation 
of sexuality as the nexus.  See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED:  
DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987) [hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED]; 
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979); CATHARINE 
A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989) [hereinafter MACKINNON, 
TOWARD].  Compilations of feminist legal theory writings include, for example, APPLICATIONS 
OF FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY TO WOMEN’S LIVES:  SEX, VIOLENCE, WORK, AND REPRODUCTION 
(D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1996). 
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1970s, nurtured in the 1980s, and matured in the 1990s.  I suggest in this 
Article that it is now seemingly in decline, and may soon disappear 
altogether. 
The reasons for this trajectory, I believe, are to date unexplored.  Some 
reasons are fairly self-evident.  Feminist legal theory was a product of three 
time-specific factors peculiar to the 1970s and 1980s:  it reflected the political 
and the legal struggles of second-wave feminism.14  The critical theory 
schools were, to varying degrees, present or thriving in the academy in the 
1970s and 1980s,15 within which feminist legal theory was birthed, grew, and 
then coexisted with critical theory, albeit at times very uneasily; and this 
feminist theory reflected second-wave women faculty and students’ mixed 
experiences of assimilation, success, and alienation in law schools 
themselves, as briefly recited above.16  Those three factors—the background 
politics, the presence of critical theory in law schools, and the differences in 
women’s experience of those schools—are all themselves either disappearing 
or dissipating in felt urgency, albeit in different ways and at different speeds, 
and that dissipation clearly is a part of the story of feminist legal theory’s 
decline.  There are other reasons for its decline as well, however.  Some are 
internal to feminism and feminist theory, and some pertain to the changing 
nature of legal scholarship from the 1980s to the present.  I explore these 
reasons in Part II below. 
The story of the development of a distinctively feminist legal theory during 
the 1970s through the 1990s, and the story of its decline in the 2000s, is of 
obvious relevance to the history of second- and third-wave feminism.  It 
should also be of interest for what it reveals about the nature of legal 
scholarship as it was understood, received, and produced in those decades.  
Its decline likewise reveals something about the changing nature of legal 
scholarship and the legal academy today.  Thus, one conclusion I draw is that 
the feminist legal theory of the 1970s through the 1990s—regardless of the 
truth or lasting power of its claims—stands as an example of a type of legal 
scholarship that was somewhat distinctive to those decades.  That form of 
legal scholarship, furthermore, likely can only emanate from the legal 
academy.  For a host of reasons, we are currently in danger of losing this 
entire genre of intellectual work, which would be the polity’s loss, not just 
feminism’s or the legal academy’s. 
 
 14. Abortion rights were constitutionalized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), in the 
early 1970s, and women were included in Title VII’s prohibition on employment 
discrimination and Title IX’s prohibition on unequal education in the mid-1960s. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2 (2012) (codifying Title VII of the Civil Rights Act’s prohibition on employment 
discrimination on the basis of sex); see also 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2012) (codifying Title 
IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972). 
 15. See generally MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987) 
(introducing the theory and major theorists of the critical legal studies tradition); THE POLITICS 
OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998). 
 16. See supra notes 2–11 and accompanying text. 
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I.  FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY AND ITS ORIGINS:  FEMINIST POLITICS, 
LIBERAL LEGALISM, AND CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 
As women entered law schools in significant numbers, first as students and 
then as faculty in the 1970s and 1980s, there developed a growing recognition 
that even while individual female students, faculty, lawyers, and judges were 
more or less succeeding, in spite of the challenges, at this man’s game, 
women overall were not doing so well in liberal legalism’s empire, whether 
measured in terms of wealth, well-being, or hedonic happiness.17  There also 
developed a sense that the reason for this, at least in part, was neither biology 
nor culture—neither nature nor nurture, not in the stars and not in ourselves—
but, rather, in law.18  This dawning recognition came, we can say some 
decades later, as a bit of a shock.  It happened, after all, in the 1970s and 
1980s, in what can be fairly called the post–civil rights era, after the major 
battles of second-wave liberal feminism in both Congress and the courts had 
already been won and after the law had been metaphorically purified of bias.  
Title VII and Title IX had already passed, forbidding overt and sometimes 
covert discrimination at work and school.19  It is worth stressing that these 
laws were already on the books during this period and had been for over a 
decade.  Discrimination against women in the workforce and in schools was 
already illegal.  Ruth Bader Ginsburg, now Justice Ginsburg of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, was in the process of winning lawsuits that would establish 
gender as something akin to a suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and would soon render all gender distinctions 
in federal and state law presumptively unconstitutional.20  The Equal Rights 
Amendment (ERA) had been proposed and failed, but the Supreme Court 
had largely picked up the slack by enshrining formal gender equality as a 
condition of the constitutionality of scores of federal and state laws.21  Sexual 
harassment was soon to be firmly established as a civil rights violation under 
a generous, and by no means obvious, interpretation of Title VII’s prohibition 
 
 17. Thus, the impetus for the first wave of “Women and the Law” courses in American 
law schools. See generally Kay, supra note 6; Ann Shalleck, Report of the Women and the 
Law Project:  Gender Bias and the Law School Curriculum, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 97 (1988). 
 18. For an early, thorough, and still-definitive analysis of disparities in U.S. women’s 
education, wealth, and empowerment, which links those disparities to law, see JOAN HOFF, 
LAW, GENDER, AND INJUSTICE:  A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. WOMEN (1991).  For further 
discussion, see EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 49–249 (discussing women’s experiences in law 
schools and the legal profession as well as the impact of women in law on substantive law); 
and CAROL SMART, FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAW (1989) (discussing the impact of 
feminist legal theory on criminal law). 
 19. See Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 241, 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012)); see also Pub. L. No. 92-318, tit. IX, 86 Stat. 235, 373 (codified 
as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2012)). 
 20. See generally United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Frontiero v. Richardson, 
411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
 21. For a history of the failed attempt to pass the ERA, see generally JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, 
WHY WE LOST THE ERA (1986). 
2018] WOMEN IN THE LEGAL ACADEMY 983 
against discrimination.22  Roe v. Wade23 and Griswold v. Connecticut24 were 
already decided and had accorded women considerable power over their 
reproductive lives.  No-fault divorce was on the books, freeing women from 
oppressive and sometimes violent marriages.25  Illegitimacy was first a 
suspect class, and then not much of a class at all, further severing the felt 
necessity of the bond between mothering and traditional marital 
heterosexuality.26 
Yet even with nondiscrimination guarantees in the workplace and 
reproductive choice in private life secured—by any reckoning the two major 
priorities of second-wave feminism, both politically and legally—women of 
all races, sexualities, and classes were not making the substantial strides one 
might have hoped or sensibly predicted.  Look first at money:  at the top, 
glass ceilings were proving to be impenetrable.27  In the middle, a sizeable 
pay and prestige gap endured, even with Title VII protections, through a 
seeming combination of invisible and unprovable discrimination.  Arguably, 
this was coupled with women’s somewhat coerced and somewhat free 
choices to occupy fields that were compatible with mothering, and hence paid 
less, or to leave the workforce altogether during the early years of childhood, 
with subsequent reentry at lower pay.28  At the bottom of the wage scale, 
 
 22. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986). 
 23. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 24. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 25. Lenore Weitzman argued influentially that no-fault divorce hurt traditional domestic 
housewives financially, setting off a debate regarding the overall impact of the no-fault 
revolution on women’s equality and liberty. LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE 
REVOLUTION:  THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND 
CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985).  But see Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference:  A 
Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1987) (arguing for 
the beneficial consequences of no-fault divorce for women overall, even if some women are 
hurt financially). 
 26. See, e.g., Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (finding the denial of paternal 
support to illegitimate children to be a violation of equal protection and therefore 
unconstitutional); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 169–70 (1972) (finding the 
denial of workers compensation survival benefits to illegitimate children to be a denial of 
equal protection and therefore unconstitutional).  For a general discussion of the relevance of 
the transformation of the status of illegitimacy to changing understandings of marriage, 
gender, and gay and lesbian family rights, see Nancy D. Polikoff, Equality and Justice for 
Lesbian and Gay Families and Relationships, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 529 (2009). 
 27. For a discussion of the glass ceiling from the 1980s to the present, see Fatih Guvenen, 
Greg Kaplan & Jae Song, The Glass Ceiling and the Paper Floor:  Gender Differences among 
Top Earners, 1981–2012 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20,560, 2014), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w20560.pdf [https://perma.cc/S545-5GVV].  For a comparison 
and contrast of the glass escalator (for men in women-dominated professions) from the 1980s 
to the 2010s, see generally Christine L. Williams, The Glass Escalator, Revisited:  Gender 
Inequality in Neoliberal Times, 27 GENDER & SOC’Y 609 (2013). 
 28. Explanations for the persistent pay gap have varied widely.  See, e.g., PAULA ENGLAND 
& GEORGE FARKAS, HOUSEHOLDS, EMPLOYMENT AND GENDER:  A SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND 
DEMOGRAPHIC VIEW (1986) (stating that sex-segregated jobs and continuing second-shift 
labor at home contribute to a persistent gap); ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT:  
WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME (1989) (holding the gap attributable in 
substantial part to disproportionate domestic labor in the home); Paula England, The Gender 
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conditions remained dire for all women workers, but particularly for single 
mothers performing both unskilled paid labor in the workplace and unpaid 
labor in the home.29 
Look at culture:  women were still boxed out of the production of art, 
music, fiction, and entertainment in venues ranging from Hollywood and 
videogaming to the Museum of Modern Art.30 
Look at political power:  in government, the gap between the 50 percent 
of the represented population and the miniscule number of female 
representatives in both houses of Congress, and similar gaps in the judicial 
and executive branches, yawned.31 
Look at family life:  for all classes, women in the private sphere continued 
to do the bulk of both child and elder care in the home, regardless of marital 
status and regardless of whether they paired off with male partners, which 
depressed women’s wages and maximized female exhaustion.32 
And look of course at sex:  women of all classes, races, ages, and 
orientations continued to suffer unchecked sexual assault on the street, 
underdeterred sexual harassment in the workplace and at school, and 
imperious marital rape in the home, while stranger and acquaintance rape 
were policed only fitfully and inadequately.33  At work, at school, in the 
home, on the street, in the bedroom, in the nursery, in the factory, and in the 
office, equality and well-being both proved elusive, even in the era of 
nondiscrimination and enhanced reproductive choice. 
Women faculty in the legal academy in the 1970s and 1980s responded to 
this paradox—the abundance of formal gender equality in the law, secured 
through victories in Congress and the Supreme Court contrasted with an 
 
Revolution:  Uneven and Stalled, 24 GENDER & SOC’Y 149 (2010) (finding the pay gap largely 
attributable to women and men entering sex-segregated jobs defined by gender). 
 29. For discussion of the struggles of low-wage mothers, see KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA 
LEIN, MAKING ENDS MEET:  HOW SINGLE MOTHERS SURVIVE WELFARE AND LOW-WAGE 
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abundance of inequality in the lived experiences of women—with a flood of 
amici briefs in scores of cases, which sought to enlarge the scope of those 
second-wave liberal and feminist victories by either enhancing or broadening 
the principles underlying them or, in some cases, unearthing their more 
radical anti-subordinationist legal potential.34  Feminist legal scholars also 
responded, however, to the apparent limits of liberal legalism, including 
liberal feminist legalism, with the creation of a new field of academic study 
and inquiry, which later came to be called “feminist legal theory.”35  
Reflecting, in part, its origin in this conundrum—a recognition of both the 
promise and the limits of the profoundly liberal norms of antidiscrimination 
law that had already been encoded in Title VII, the reproductive rights that 
had been recognized by the Supreme Court, and the formal equality that was 
by this point seemingly mandated by the Constitution—the feminist legal 
theory that developed during those decades was driven by at least two 
 
 34. Feminist law professors filed amici briefs, represented parties, or otherwise played 
significant roles in a number of pivotal Supreme Court cases, including, among others, Nevada 
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003); United States v. Morrison, 
529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating parts of the Violence Against Women Act as 
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criminality.  The brief is reprinted in Lynn M. Paltrow, Amicus Brief:  Richard Thornburgh v. 
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19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 21, 40 (2010); Lynn M. Paltrow, Women, Abortion and Civil 
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Feminist Legal Theory, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 13 (2005); Ruth Fletcher, 
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defining, albeit mostly unstated, fundamental insights.  These two insights, 
or assumptions, were in considerable tension with each other.  The first was 
a deeply critical and interpretive claim, which partly echoed themes from 
critical legal studies but mostly rested on the experienced limits of liberal 
legalism in the lives of women, its directly intended beneficiaries.  I will call 
it the “critical-feminist claim.”  The critical-feminist claim was simply that 
at least one reason for women’s continuing subordination to men in liberal 
legal regimes was, in some measure, law itself.36  Some feminist theorists, 
most prominently Catharine MacKinnon, focused their critique directly and 
concretely on those laws or areas of law which were themselves the product 
of liberal and feminist political activism.  Some examples include 
antidiscrimination laws from the 1960s;37 the privacy jurisprudence 
generated by the Supreme Court in the 1970s, which accords some measure 
of reproductive choice;38 and the norm of formal equality that constituted the 
basis for the judiciary’s invalidation of scores of gender-based distinctions in 
federal and state law.39  MacKinnon’s now-familiar arguments, taken 
collectively and in a nutshell, were threefold:  (1) the nondiscrimination norm 
enshrined in Title VII provides relief only for the most privileged women 
while legitimating the injustice and hardship that cannot be captured in its 
formulaic rules through, at best, benign neglect;40 (2) the privacy doctrine 
developed in Roe and Griswold is a Faustian bargain that obfuscates, masks, 
and privatizes domestic and sexual violence, and more broadly protects 
rather than dismantles the patriarchal hierarchies that persist in private 
homes;41 and (3) the formal equality enshrined in the Court’s jurisprudence 
entrenches the status quo by making man the measure of all things, yielding 
only the compromised and Trojan-horse-like concession that those few 
women who have always measured up, but have not been fully acknowledged 
as having done so, will heretofore be given their due.42  These three claims 
can today fairly be ascribed to radical feminism rather than solely to 
MacKinnon, but it was not, by any means, only radical feminists who 
embraced the most basic critical claim of which these are instances—that 
liberal legalism as it had developed through the civil rights era was at least a 
part of the cause of women’s continuing relative disempowerment and 
disadvantage.  Liberal feminists parted company with these radical 
 
 36. For impactful studies from the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s of the role of law in shaping 
and misshaping women’s lives, see generally ZILLAH EISENSTEIN, THE FEMALE BODY AND THE 
LAW (1989); HOFF, supra note 18; MACKINNON, TOWARD, supra note 13; and ELIZABETH 
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 37. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 13, at 32–45; MACKINNON, 
TOWARD, supra note 13 at 215–34. 
 38. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 13, at 93–102; MACKINNON, 
TOWARD, supra note 13, at 184–94; Catherine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality 
Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281 (1991). 
 39. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 13, at 21–32. 
 40. MacKinnon, supra note 38, at 1283–97; see also MACKINNON, FEMINISM 
UNMODIFIED, supra note 13, at 70–77. 
 41. MacKinnon, supra note 38, at 1311; see also MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, 
supra note 13, at 93–102. 
 42. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 13, at 32–45. 
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arguments but nevertheless argued for a distinctively different and richer 
conception of autonomy, including sexual autonomy, than that enshrined in 
the Court’s privacy jurisprudence precisely in order to accord greater 
protection for victims of sexual violence as well as sexual and gender 
minorities.43  Relational feminists, as well as some liberal feminists, argued 
for a conception of well-being that would recognize relationality as well as 
autonomy as essentially human and as deserving of the protection of law, 
thereby suggesting the need for and justification of greater benefits to women 
and men caregivers.44  Thus, the basis for the critical-feminist claim in those 
decades was not simply an orientation toward Marxism, or skepticism 
regarding the redemptive powers of sexuality, or a Gramscian structural 
claim about women’s consciousness, all of which came to characterize in 
different ways varying strands of radical feminist scholarship.45  The critical-
feminist claim was, for many feminists writing at the time, grounded in the 
felt reality of the limited capacity of liberal legalism’s most defining ideals 
to reach the core of women’s experiences in law’s liberal empire, including 
the experiences of women in the liberal legal academy of the time. 
The second defining claim of what came to be called feminist legal theory, 
which was and is in considerable tension with the first, was the aspirational 
insistence that, nevertheless, law, liberalism, and legalism all, imaginatively 
rendered, are central to progress toward greater substantive gender equality 
and well-being.46  I call this second prong the “feminist-aspirational claim.”  
This claim rested on the assumption, which was almost never explicitly stated 
within feminism, that law in liberal legal regimes has within it, so to speak, 
the seeds of a promise of equality, no less than the more widely 
acknowledged seeds of a promise of ordered liberty.  Although those seeds 
can be sometimes smothered by law’s subordinating branches, and although 
they have never matured to become the trunk of a solid tree, and although 
they require obsessive and relentless tending and care, they do nevertheless 
exist.47  What came to be called feminist legal theory thus generally shared 
 
 43. For similar liberal-legal feminist accounts that argue for a stronger conception of 
autonomy, or for a conception of autonomy more attuned to women’s needs or interests, see 
EILEEN L. MCDONAGH, BREAKING THE ABORTION DEADLOCK:  FROM CHOICE TO CONSENT 
(1996); Law, supra note 12; and Linda McClain, Reconstructive Tasks for a Liberal Feminist 
Conception of Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 759 (1999). 
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385 (2005). 
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liberal legalism’s defining faith in law’s redemptive potential, its 
compromised but nevertheless essential relation to justice, and its necessity 
to the achievement of any meaningful progress toward a decent life for all 
the world’s inhabitants.  Combining these claims, the feminist legal theory 
of those decades unabashedly had the dual mission of understanding the 
depth of legal complicity in the ongoing subordination of women, even in the 
post–civil rights era of formal equality and nondiscrimination, and of 
reversing that subordination with law and legal tools, including those that 
were the subject of feminist critique. 
An outpouring of aspirational legal scholarship attests to the power and 
breadth of the feminist-aspirational conviction, which crossed all the 
ordinary divides within legal feminism.  Radical feminists looked not only to 
criticize but also to reinterpret and then to deploy existing law—notably, 
constitutional law, criminal law, tort law, and civil rights law—all toward the 
end of aligning legalism in feminism’s political and legal battle against 
patriarchy.48  And, for very good reason.  To the considerable degree to 
which the subordination of women has sexual violence and violation at its 
core, radical feminists sought to direct law—which has always had at its core 
a prohibition against private violence—to address sexual violence through 
interpretations of civil rights law to reach sexual harassment and through 
constant and ongoing efforts to reorient the criminal law of rape and sexual 
assault so as to provide women the equal protection of law guaranteed by 
something resembling the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
This is a radical reorientation of liberal legalism’s defining, Hobbesian 
commitment to battle private violence toward violence admixed with sex.  
Radical though it may be, it is, nevertheless, a reorientation of law that relies 
on law’s deep and preexisting “always there” commitments against private 
violence, not a revolutionary displacement of it.  Liberal feminists sought, in 
scholarship as well as amici briefs, to interpret the privacy rights recognized 
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in Roe and Griswold to include rights for sexual minorities49 and to extend 
the rights of nondiscrimination recognized in Title VII to include rights 
against gender-neutral employment policies with gender-specific adverse 
impacts.50  Again, these interventions constituted a reorientation, not a 
displacement, of liberal legal commitments to privacy, liberty, and equal 
treatment.  Relational and liberal feminists sought or supported in their 
scholarship the quest for new legislation—and eventually for the deeply 
compromised Family and Medical Leave Act51—that would accord greater 
equality for women at work through ensuring a right to some job security for 
women workers who face a necessary separation from employment for 
caregiving reasons.52  This was a reorientation as well—not a displacement 
of liberal commitments to nondiscrimination.  All of these efforts reflected a 
conviction that liberal legalism rests solidly on a not-to-be-ignored mandate, 
internal to its deep structure, to extend, reshape, modify, and, when need be, 
amend itself in such a way as to fairly protect women as equally as men.  
Further, these efforts demonstrated that the tools with which to do so exist 
internal to legalism.  This basic faith in legalism coexisted in the formative 
years of feminist legal theory with the equally basic critical claim that liberal 
legalism had failed to do so.  As such, this commitment to legalism, alongside 
a commitment to criticism, came to characterize and broadly define feminist 
legal theory.  The two prongs of this grounding—critical and aspirational 
legalism—were in tension with each other and required the development of 
not just scholarship, but theory.  I take them in order and then speak to the 
implications of their joint embrace. 
The critical ambition—understanding the ways in which a liberal legal 
regime and its basic commitments, including commitments to 
nondiscrimination, reproductive freedom, and formal equality, were 
complicit in the ongoing subordination of women—grounded the production 
of a body of scholarship that differed fundamentally from the reformist 
impulses that had typified the bulk of doctrinal legal scholarship in the legal 
academy through the 1950s and 1960s.  The point of it was, again, critique.  
Feminist scholarship sought an understanding of the ways in which liberal 
legalism was undermining the quest for substantive equality in spite of the 
considerable liberal and feminist legal victories of the 1960s and early 1970s.  
That, in turn, required a broadened set of academic tools, skills, and entire 
disciplines.  It required interdisciplinary work, for one.  But more 
fundamentally, it required scholarly tools that could pierce the legitimating 
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veil of formal equality and formal individualism, a veil that thickly shrouded 
the experiences of subordination—experiences that persisted in spite of the 
celebrated liberal victories of the decade prior. 
The extant critical legal studies movement of the time—with its already 
nuanced understanding of the workings of legitimation, hegemony, and 
obfuscation (particularly the detailed application of these concepts to the 
various doctrines forbidding race discrimination in public and private law)—
provided some of the tools of that quest.53  As in the context of race 
discrimination, doctrines forbidding gender discrimination and mandating 
formal equality on the basis of sex can both enforce norms against treating 
likes differently and, at the same time, legitimate the considerable degree to 
which women who are most unlike men—whether because of caregiving 
status or burdens, or because of the sufferance of continual sexual violation—
can remain in subordinate roles.  Legitimation, the critics had shown, could 
be understood as a fundamental function, and even purpose, of even the most 
generous liberal laws, particularly nondiscrimination law.  While targeting 
the unlike treatment of likes, it legitimates the continuing subordination of 
those made unlike by political, economic, and social forces.  This can readily 
be shown to be true of women, no less than of racial and ethnic minorities.  
Even more broadly, legitimation theory, particularly as developed by the 
European critical theorist Antonio Gramsci,54 could help explain the ways in 
which women’s consent to coerced choices—particularly women’s consent 
to unwanted sex, routinized and mandated caregiving, and submissive roles 
and ways of being—was legitimating the structures of coercion that rendered 
all of that consent both fully rational but nevertheless conducive to 
oppression rather than liberation.  Consent, then, as well as the 
nondiscrimination norm, can be understood as legitimating continuing 
subordination; the critical legal scholars’ development of the idea of 
legitimation in the context of American law unquestionably facilitated that 
understanding.  The related idea of hegemony, also made familiar by critical 
legal scholars, could account for the ways in which commitments to gender 
as well as race blindness created a false sense of the justice of current 
distributions of wealth and power along gender lines and a refusal to 
countenance more deeply entrenched injustice.  Similarly, the idea of 
 
 53. See generally DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL:  THE PERMANENCE 
OF RACISM (1992); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980); Derrick Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, 
103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622 (2003); Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363 (1992); 
Alan Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law:  A 
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978); Alan Freeman, 
Racism, Rights and the Quest for Equality of Opportunity:  A Critical Legal Essay, 23 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 295 (1988). 
 54. On Gramsci’s influence on critical legal studies, see generally Douglas Litowitz, 
Gramsci, Hegemony, and the Law, 2000 BYU L. REV. 515, 531–39.  For early critical legal 
studies pieces broadly incorporating Gramscian theories of hegemony and legitimation, see 
Robert W. Gordon, Some Critical Theories of Law and Their Critics, in THE POLITICS OF LAW:  
A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 641 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998); Robert W. Gordon, Unfreezing 
Legal Reality:  Critical Approaches to Law, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 195, 216–20 (1987); and 
Duncan Kennedy, Antonio Gramsci and the Legal System, 6 ALSA F. 32 (1982). 
2018] WOMEN IN THE LEGAL ACADEMY 991 
masking or of obfuscation, introduced into the legal lexicon by critical 
scholars, could go some distance toward an explication of the ways in which 
ballyhooed Supreme Court victories and legislative wins mask the continuing 
evils yet untouched by those victories. 
It was not, however, solely critical theory that informed feminism’s critical 
dimension.  Although less understood, liberal political theory did as well.  
Liberal political theory, from Locke and Hobbes and others, provided an 
understanding of the necessity of the state’s protection against private 
violence to the enjoyment of liberty and equality in liberal regimes and, 
hence, a deeply liberal—in fact Hobbesian—understanding of why the state’s 
myriad failures to protect against private violence has proven to be so 
devastating for women, as well as for liberalism itself.55  Liberalism, if we 
focus on the central liberal commitment to the state’s monopoly on private 
violence, is itself incompatible with patriarchy to the considerable degree to 
which patriarchy depends upon private sexual violence as a pillar of its grip 
on power.  Liberalism therefore, no less than critical theory, provides tools 
with which to understand this political and psychic dynamic.  And finally, 
classical Marxism—meaning Marxism as espoused by Marx, not “neo” 
anything—played a pivotal role in the development of feminist legal theory.  
Marx’s accounts of the alienation of the worker from his labor and from the 
value produced by that labor, as well as the commodification of that labor for 
sale and resale on markets controlled by the whims, desires, and greed of 
capitalists,56 provided a compelling analogy to the accounts of the alienation 
of women from their sexuality and the value, including the pleasure, 
produced by that sexuality, as well as the commodification of that sexuality 
on markets controlled by the whims and desires of men.57  A similar 
analogical account, which was never quite forthcoming in the legal literature, 
could be and perhaps should be mounted on the alienation of women from 
their reproductive labor and the products of that labor, meaning their own 
children.58  In fact, I believe that the lack of such an account is one reason 
for the shortfall in feminist legal theory’s ambition to understand the role of 
law in the complicity in women’s subordination. 
However, none of these tools—critical theory, liberal political theory, or 
Marxism—were sufficient, even if all might have been necessary, to 
understand the persistence of patriarchy in the face of liberal legal victories.  
That understanding also required “feminism unadulterated,” so to speak.  
One lesson, and perhaps the central lesson, of late-twentieth-century political 
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feminism is that the harms women sustain and have sustained by virtue of 
their unequal status across two millennia have been thoroughly privatized 
and, for that reason, rendered invisible to law.  These harms have been 
blocked from view by literal and figurative walls of patriarchal privilege, 
modernist commitments to familial privacy, ideologies weaponizing the 
differences in the basic humanity of men and women, and widely shared 
beliefs in women’s lesser capacities for reason, principled moral action, and 
political capacity, as well as shared beliefs in their greater propensity toward 
not just domesticity, but also toward submission and obsequious deference, 
all viewed, collectively, as central to either female maternalism or female 
sexuality.  Liberalism, and therefore liberal legalism, in short, does not 
countenance these invisible harms because they have walled them off inside 
a domain of intimacy, ceding authority—including the authority to use force, 
once called “chastisement”—to male rather than state authority.  Left-wing 
twentieth-century critical theory did not come anywhere even close to this 
basic truth because it could not countenance the degree to which patriarchy 
had been constructed by a regime in which violence itself was both 
sexualized and maternalized, such that what was perceived by some as sexual 
or maternal was experienced by others as violence.  This entire dynamic is 
quite different from the more familiar forms of invisible oppression that were 
comprehensible to the male critical theorist, including the legitimating 
functions of consent, antidiscrimination law itself, hegemony, and the 
masking and obfuscation of state and private-sphere economic power.  To 
understand inequality as an injury or a harm and to understand sexual and 
reproductive violence its mechanism, in the face of descriptive accounts of 
the world in which the injurious nature of that inequality is denied, 
trivialized, or gaslighted, required a form of analysis that was (and is) only 
available through feminism. 
That way of knowing and that way of understanding, furthermore, can only 
be characterized, methodologically, as consciousness-raising.  And, that 
method is itself not at all straightforward, has nowhere been adequately 
theorized, and is not understood academically in the slightest.  But it was 
nevertheless, as MacKinnon claimed forty years ago, an indispensable part 
of feminism and therefore an indispensable part of feminist legal theory.59  
When victims themselves understand their own victimization as consensual, 
or as delusional, or as trivial, or as inconsequential, or even as oxymoronic, 
more than simple listening is required to even address, much less rectify, 
those harms.  What is required is a raising of the consciousness of those 
perceptions as harms themselves, which is by necessity an objective 
assessment and a crediting of the authenticity of long-denied subjective 
experience.  It is not simply having an open mind.  It is paying heed to 
women’s accounts of their own lesser lives and mapping those interior lines 
of reduced significance, perception, and experience.  It is then judging those 
accounts against an admixture of idealism, comparative value, and 
phenomenological awareness. 
 
 59. MACKINNON, TOWARD, supra note 13, at 83–105. 
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To unearth an awareness of the facticity, significance, seriousness, and 
impact of sexual and reproductive injuries that have been objectively denied 
and trivialized is indeed to re-form consciousness, including legal 
consciousness.  Therefore it is not at all surprising, in retrospect, that feminist 
legal theorists in those decades, and to some degree continuing through to 
today, relied so heavily on women’s accounts of their own experiences, 
including their own, to heighten understanding of any analysis that 
surrounded it.  Susan Estrich,60 Lynne Henderson,61 Susan Brison,62 
Michelle Anderson,63 this author,64 and scores of others wrote of their own 
experiences of sexual assault, in part to connect with readers who had similar 
and unacknowledged experiences, in part to heighten understanding, in part 
to trigger empathy, and in part to underscore the sexuality of the violence as 
well as the violence at the heart of the act of rape.  Others wrote of sexual 
harassment at work or sexual assault on the street to underscore the frequency 
of these events and therefore their constitutive nature—the ways in which 
they operate not as disruptive events in the otherwise placid lives of women, 
but as defining events that, for many, constitute womanhood or girlhood.65  
Others wrote similar narrative accounts, whether journalistic, memoir-styled, 
or fictitious, to convey the seriousness and ubiquity of domestic violence—
violence that escapes notice by states, in part because truly and seriously 
violent events are widely understood to be occasional or exceptional 
disruptions of the king’s peace as well as that of his subjects, and not defining 
events that demarcate an arena of delegated authority.66  To convey domestic 
violence as a political reality that serves that function—to demarcate an arena 
of delegated authority—requires conveying its frequency conjoined with its 
severity, and in an era when these violations are shrouded in privacy, that in 
turn requires anecdotal recordation.  This writing filled a middle premise for 
both liberal-feminist and radical-feminist arguments.  For liberals and liberal 
feminists, the point was to establish the injury, which could then be addressed 
with liberal tools of the state.  For radical feminists, the point was to establish 
the subordinating impact of those injuries, which required a radical 
realignment of both law and politics.  For both, however, “feminism 
unadulterated” provided the phenomenological grounding. 
All of that taken collectively constituted feminism’s critical wing.  Now I 
turn to feminist legal theory’s aspirational-legalist commitments.  The 
aspirational commitment of the feminist legal theory of those decades 
required a very different set of conceptual tools, which were often in direct 
opposition to those required by its critical commitments.  It required a clear 
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understanding of law’s redemptive potential, in the face of its massively 
subordinating capacity.  Criticism, by contrast, required a clear 
understanding of law’s subordinating and oppressive potential in the face of 
its seeming liberality.  The aspirational dimension of feminist legal theory 
required, in short, a commitment to the ideals not only of liberalism but also 
of legalism, with the latter understood not only as a vocabulary, tool kit, or 
propensity toward rule governance, but also as a set of ideals, a way of 
viewing the world, and a way of embracing the institutional past of the nation 
as one’s own.  As a number of legal theorists have argued, albeit in very 
different ways and toward different ends, legalism professes what is best 
understood as a Burkean kind of conservativism:  a belief in the value of that 
which has been decided, a commitment to honoring the decisions of decades-
long and sometimes centuries-long vintage, and a willingness to align oneself 
with those legal decisions and decision makers in a chain of shared 
professionalism, with shared professional commitments.67  In its feminist 
mode, then, it requires a generous appraisal of the capacity of legalism’s 
guardians to recognize women—cis, trans, children, and raced individuals—
to understand law as existing for them and for their protection, and not only 
for the whims or needs of dominant groups to oppress.  It requires starry-
eyed appreciation of law’s capacity for nobility, as well as clear-eyed 
appreciation of its turns through the centuries toward mendacity.  More than 
recognition or appreciation, it requires a participatory stance in law’s 
evolution, and so it requires the faith in legal institutions that participation in 
them presupposes:  that the paths and subpaths of law’s evolution that point 
toward enhanced democratization of its protective umbrella can collectively 
point toward justice, such that it is worth the effort expended in doing some 
of the clearing required for those paths to be visible, much less trodden. 
The capacity and willingness to hold onto both the critical and aspirational 
commitments described above defined the feminist legal theory of the last 
quarter of the last century.  In feminist terms, this meant holding the 
simultaneous beliefs that legalism was a long-standing support of patriarchy 
(for centuries it had served to legitimate and obfuscate its oppressive 
qualities, facilitate the alienation of female sexuality, protect a cultural sphere 
of subservience and consensual submission, and wall off its violence within 
a familial sphere) while also holding the belief that legalism was grounded 
in ideals (the liberation of the individual from fears of private violence and 
violation, as well as the equality and individuation that liberation generates) 
that are antithetical to the patriarchal regimes it buttressed.  It meant holding 
a willful double consciousness toward legalism’s virtues and legalism’s 
malignancy, embracing its double-sidedness, and acknowledging its 
conflicted stance toward the centers of power—some benign, some 
malignant—that challenge its hegemony.  It required, distinctively, a 
recognition that the contradictory impulses toward liberation and oppression, 
with respect to gender itself, lies in law and not in ourselves or in our culture. 
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II.  FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY, FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE, 
AND NORMATIVE LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
Feminist jurisprudence—largely understood as a body of legal scholarship 
dedicated to understanding issues of relevance to the law’s treatment of 
gender and sexuality—is thriving.  Feminist legal theory, however—a body 
of theoretical scholarship committed to jointly understanding the role of law 
in the continuing subordination of women and the use of law as a tool with 
which to combat that subordination—is not.  It reached an apex in the early 
1990s, and it has been in retreat since then.  It is worth exploring why.  Some 
reasons have to do with turns taken within academic feminism and feminist 
activism.  Some have to do, however, with turns taken in law schools, in legal 
scholarship, and in the overall nature of the legal academy’s posture toward 
law as an object of study. 
Within feminist jurisprudence and within academic feminism, a number of 
forces have converged to sideline theory.  Foremost is the postmodern turn 
that swept the humanities, and then law, in the 1990s and 2000s, which has 
evinced a skepticism toward large interpretive claims (among much else), 
including both liberal and radical feminism’s large interpretive claims about 
the nature of patriarchy, women, male dominance, power, sexuality, and 
law.68  Claims central to radical feminism regarding the omnipresence of 
false consciousness—particularly the claim that women’s capacity to render 
self-regarding consent is compromised by internalized patriarchal 
conceptions of female nature—and its embrace of methods that require some 
measure of consciousness-raising for gaining both greater self-regard and 
awareness, and hence knowledge, were the most vulnerable to postmodern 
critique.  This vulnerability to criticism stemmed particularly from their overt 
reliance on objective understandings of women’s true nature and interests, 
against which extant consciousness can be adjudged false, and a better 
consciousness adjudged as higher.  Thus, skeptical claims regarding the value 
of women’s consensual choices, central to any number of radical-feminist 
arguments, became the subject of postmodern and skeptical analysis as the 
basis for the comparative judgments was rendered suspect.  A regard for a 
reconstituted liberalism, and hence liberal feminism, converged with 
postmodernism to cast campaigns against pornography and sex work, as well 
as, to a lesser degree, sexual harassment, in some doubt within feminism.  
The postmodern turn was also bolstered within feminism by the emergence 
of intersectional feminism, or critical race feminism, which sought to 
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decenter the experiences of white women as the prototype for understanding 
patriarchy and for guiding feminist reform.69  Intersectional feminism is in 
no way dependent upon postmodernism.  Nevertheless, they overlap 
strategically at various points.  They counsel a more pragmatic and less 
dogmatic stance toward claims regarding women’s nature and the evidentiary 
bases for such claims, when that evidence itself consists of truths ostensibly 
borne of women’s experience but in fact unduly reliant upon the experience 
of white or otherwise privileged women. 
Second, feminists quite famously split in the 1980s on a host of pressing 
political issues, including, prominently, the wisdom of legislating against 
pornography.  Liberal, pro-sex, and postmodern feminists sided with 
nonfeminist liberals over the dangers of legislating against pornography, 
echoing old liberal worries over anti-obscenity statutes.70  For similar 
reasons, the same coalition later sided again with liberals over the dangers of 
criminalizing prostitution and the value for sex workers in legalization 
strategies.  Radical feminists, by contrast, advocated an active role for the 
state in prohibiting the alienation and sale of female sexuality in both realms.  
Behind both divisions lay considerably more than merely strategic 
divergence.  For radicals, the production and then acquisition of female 
sexual labor was perceived to be the point of women’s subordination as well 
as the means by which it is achieved.71  For liberals, the suppression of 
sexuality of both genders by puritanical or religious conceptions of the role 
of sexuality was a greater danger to women than the production of sex for 
male consumption.72  And, for liberal, pro-sex, and postmodern feminists, 
sexuality itself was a vehicle for personal liberation, not for large-scale 
subordination.73  Conflicting views of sex—sex as subordination and sex as 
liberation—is as close to a contradiction as one can imagine; there is and was 
no papering over its significance.74 
Third, radical and liberal feminists split on the wisdom of pursuing 
strategies to combat sexual violence that were (and still are) dependent upon 
use of the criminal justice system.  Rape, domestic violence, stalking, and 
sexual assault are all underenforced crimes, and women have suffered the 
consequences of that underenforcement.  Enforcing them, however, means 
increasing the number of incarcerated citizens, with all the attendant harms 
associated with our current criminal justice system.  This may well decrease 
the amount of sexual violence suffered by women, but it will also feed the 
crisis of overincarceration.75  Consequently, some feminists are pursuing 
strategies for lowering rates of sexual violence through nonincarceral 
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means.76  Others, particularly sex-positive and postmodern feminists, are 
raising doubts about the ubiquity of sexual assault.77  The debate implicates 
differing views of the state and the wisdom of relying on the state’s punitive 
arm, but it also involves differing views of sex, violence, and sexual violence. 
Fourth, the demise of feminist legal theory also tracks the demise of a 
number of related theoretical movements within the legal academy, including 
most prominently the demise of critical legal theory itself.  Feminist legal 
theory in its critical and descriptive mode made startling, descriptive, and 
largely interpretive claims about law, patriarchy, feminism, and the nature of 
equality, women, moral reasoning, the role of reproduction and biology in 
women’s lives, and ultimately the fluidity of gender and sexuality.  Some of 
these claims were structural, some were starkly essentialist, and some were 
large, metahistorical claims spanning centuries.  As noted above, most of 
these large theoretical claims have been largely problematized, if not 
discredited, by the turn to postmodernism and pragmatism within feminism, 
as well as within the legal academy generally.  Claims establishing sexuality 
as the linchpin of gender subordination, but also claims regarding structural 
impediments to female advancement, claims regarding any sort of biological 
difference between men and women that would require accommodation of 
the latter rather than assimilation, claims regarding any sort of institutional 
rather than individualized account of the nature of the subordination women 
face, or claims regarding women’s nature of any sort, including claims drawn 
from feminist psychology and moral philosophy from the 1970s regarding 
women’s ways of speaking, knowing, thinking, feeling, and moralizing, have 
all been rendered problematic, not only because they face dissension from 
within feminism, but also because they partake in a structuralist or simply a 
general method for understanding the world historic subordination of the 
female sex.78  Grand historic, anthropological, biological, or certainly 
bioevolutionary claims about women’s situation, nature, or political 
subordination are problematic in an academic culture that increasingly prizes 
particularism, microhistorical narratives, and highly individuated, quantified, 
or contextualized empirical claims. 
There is an additional reason, however, for the demise or decline of 
feminist legal theory.  Feminist legal theory of the 1980s and 1990s was 
virtually, by definition, committed to the decidedly normative project of 
understanding what justice requires of law and then in participating in its 
reconstruction toward that goal.  In its basic logic, and more particularly in 
its normativity, it was utterly conventional, thoroughly legalistic, and entirely 
professional.  The logic of its aspirational and normative side was, simply 
and starkly, that “the law is X, and it ought to be Y.”  It was, in other words, 
for all its radicalism, feminism, Marxism, and structuralism—for all its 
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theoretical sophistication—deeply, thoroughly, and completely legalist in its 
most basic logic.  “The law is X but it ought to be Y” was the universal, 
constant refrain.  It is important to stress that for decades, and particularly for 
the formative decades (mid-to-late twentieth century), of what is now called 
the scholarly mission of the legal academy, this was also the skeletal form of 
almost all legal scholarship.  Most legal scholarship throughout the last 
century, in fact, generally urged some degree of difference between existing 
law and its ideal, and it then argued for some measure of reform that would 
bring the former in alignment with the latter.  Feminist legal scholarship was 
entirely in line with this overriding normative logic.79 
Feminist legal theory was an example, and in many ways a prime example, 
of what I call elsewhere “normative jurisprudence”:80  legal scholarship that 
aims to understand not only law but also justice and to advance arguments 
regarding both the ways in which law can be changed so as to be more just 
and ways in which existing law can be deployed to make the world more just.  
The defining ideal of this kind of writing, as is true of the law that is its 
subject, is justice.  Normative jurisprudential scholarship aims for justice, in 
a way that contrasts, rather than compares, with the way that scholarship in 
other parts of the academy aims for truth.  Some of that normative legal 
scholarship is “strictly doctrinal,” which simply means that the major 
premises of arguments are drawn from earlier cases and the method of 
argument is recognizably legal or adjudicative.  Some is theoretical, meaning 
that the major premises are drawn from political, legal, or moral theory.  
Some is interdisciplinary, meaning that the means of argument and some 
premises might be drawn from economics, sociology, or one of the 
humanities.  But for all of normative legal scholarship, which is to say the 
vast majority of the writing produced by legal scholars in law schools, and 
all of feminist jurisprudence, the goal of the scholarship is better law, as 
measured by a yardstick of justice, whether spoken or unspoken, defined or 
undefined.  Whether the subject of the piece of legal scholarship is a traffic 
ordinance or a constitution, the ideal toward which normative legal 
scholarship aims is good law, the point of which is a just community. 
Normative legal scholarship distinctively combines critique of existing 
law with aspirational claims about the law’s potential to deliver justice, if the 
suggested reform or reinterpretation is accepted.  Feminist legal theory from 
the 1980s and 1990s was a particularly deep example of both prongs.  The 
critical claim was both deep and broad:  that law perpetuates patriarchy and 
has done so for centuries, across the globe, and in all aspects of life.  But so 
was the aspirational claim, which advanced the idea that law, meaning 
ordinary law and not only human rights law, moral law, natural law, or 
constitutional law, can end it.  Both definitional prongs of normative legal 
scholarship—the critical side and the aspirational—are regarded today with 
considerable suspicion within and outside the legal academy.  
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Knowledgeable critics of legal scholarship from other parts of the academy, 
including prominently and most recently Stanley Fish, attack its aspirational 
dimension.81  Scholarship that aims for justice rather than truth is just not 
scholarship, and legal writers that participate in law’s creation or re-creation 
rather than studying it are not scholars.  Scholars within the legal academy, 
including prominently Paul Kahn,82 are also growing increasingly skeptical.  
Those trained in other disciplines find normative legal scholarship to be 
singularly unscholarly because it is undisciplined by the standards of the 
university’s nonlegal disciplines.  For this sizeable and growing group, law 
scholars should approach the law as the subject matter of scholarship defined 
by reference to some other discipline’s norms, practices, and methods.  So 
long as producing normative scholarship—that which aims to improve the 
law or push law to be the best it can be, or, more simply as I have defined it, 
scholarship of the form “the law is X but it ought to be Y”—is understood as 
a part of the law schools’ mission and as part of a faculty member’s 
obligation, critiques of normative scholarship put that mission and that 
understanding of a faculty member’s scholarly obligation under a cloud.  
Feminist legal theory has been in retreat, in part, simply because it is an 
example of normative jurisprudence and normative jurisprudence is itself in 
a defensive crouch. 
Feminist legal theory of the 1980s and 1990s was a prime example of 
normative jurisprudence:  it was critical, aspirational, and thoroughly 
legalistic.  In sum, it was truly and profoundly critical.  All strands, but 
particularly radical feminism, incorporated tools and insights from critical 
theory, including legitimation theory, hegemony, and skepticism regarding 
the public-private divide, to explain the continuing subordination of women 
in the post–civil rights era.  Second, it was distinctively aspirational:  all 
strands propounded visions of community that integrates and includes all.  
And third, it was consistently both legal and legalistic in method and basic 
orientation toward law:  it urged reforms that drew from existing law and 
existing legal ideals and employed methods of change that were constitutive 
of legalism’s deepest conservative impulses.  Thus, I conclude that feminist 
legal theory is embattled today, in part, not solely because of postmodernism, 
sex positivism, or antifeminist fervor, but simply because it is exemplary of 
a kind of normative legal scholarship that is itself under sustained attack from 
within and outside the legal academy. 
CONCLUSION 
Whatever might be said of postmodernism, pro-sex politics, or antifeminist 
animus, this attack on normative legal scholarship is misguided.  This kind 
of intellectual work, which has emanated from and been produced by the 
legal academy for well over a century now, is of great social value.  It is a 
kind of scholarship about law that will come, and has only come, from the 
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legal academy.  Other parts of the academy will not produce it.  Scholarship 
from the social sciences and the humanities is not directed toward justice, it 
is directed toward truth, as well it should be, even when its subject matter is 
law.  More simply, it is aimed at understanding the nature of law using 
methods drawn from elsewhere; it is not aimed at making law the best it can 
be.  Other parts of the legal profession likewise will not produce it:  lawyers 
do not have the disinterested objectivity or the time that academics have.  The 
bench will not produce it:  judges are professionally committed to deciding 
cases as they arise. 
The successes of feminist legal theory in the 1980s and 1990s, I believe, 
exemplify the value of normative legal scholarship across the board.  It 
generated enormous and, to date, sustained and widely acknowledged social 
value.  The path toward the Family and Medical Leave Act, as well as the 
Violence Against Women Act, to take just two examples, would have been 
considerably more torturous without it.  The Me Too movement would not 
be part of our contemporary landscape had feminist legal theory not found a 
home in the academy and at Yale Law School most particularly.  “Something 
was not right,” to echo Madeline’s beloved Sister Clavel, with the legal 
academy’s attempt to assimilate women into the law schools as students and 
then as faculty in the 1970s and 1980s.  Something is still not right.  As noted 
above, those battles persist.  But something was very right with the 
understanding of legal scholarship, and particularly of normative legal 
scholarship, that characterized the last three decades of the past century.  The 
consensus that this form of scholarship was both valuable and unique to law 
schools was widely shared.  It also clearly facilitated the production of 
feminist legal theory and, likewise, of much feminist jurisprudence. 
APPENDIX:  TRANSCRIPT* 
JUDGE GUIDO CALABRESI:  I am, myself, totally committed to 
normative legal scholarship.  I don’t understand what legal scholarship is if 
it isn’t normative, based on trying to achieve some kind of justice.  I do think 
that often scholars get confused between what is our job as scholars and then 
what happens in the world quickly.  My own view is that scholars can look 
in dark places, see what is going on, say what is wrong, and talk about how 
it should be righted.  And then the world ignores you, but in the long run the 
world will buy what we are saying or some parts of it, but only slowly.  In 
time we change things, and things are accepted in the world. 
My question with respect to many of the different movements going on is 
what is it that is wanted in terms of equality.  We can give equality to a 
previously subordinated group if it is willing to act like us, the previously 
dominant group.  That is equality we give you quickly and it may be 
worthwhile if you had been treated badly enough and you care enough about 
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getting equality quickly.  This is what many minorities, especially immigrant 
groups, have asked for. 
An alternative demand is “just leave us alone, don’t do anything for us; let 
us be ourselves, we want to make our own values, just leave us alone.”  
Equality for that comes much less quickly because it is much easier for the 
previously dominant group to offer equality if you behave like us. 
For me, the history of the feminist movement has been a deep division 
between these two points of view.  Some women have said, “we are willing 
to act like men, work twenty-three hours a day, accept the sexual stereotypes 
of men.”  Other feminists have said, “no, perhaps a new standard for 
everybody, perhaps a separate standard for us in different positions, but we 
don’t need to and don’t want to accept that which was the male stereotype.” 
PROFESSOR ROBIN WEST:  I don’t think the whole story is one of these 
two divisions with everyone both clamoring for equality and thinking 
through how best to get there because I’m not sure you can make sense of 
feminism that way.  You cannot make sense of where we go solely by 
anybody’s theory of equality.  What is most interesting about some strands 
of feminism is the aspirational side of it—looking for ways to make the world 
better for everyone, but not easily captured in terms of equality.  You have 
to rethink what it means to be a relational human being.  You have to rethink 
what it means to be a sexual human being.  You have to rethink what it means 
to work and to affect the world in fundamental ways.  The claim is that if you 
do this in ways that respect women’s equality of worth and dignity, then 
you’ll get to different answers than the world has produced so far.  Feminism 
is not adequately captured in the two versions of equality; within feminism 
there is yet another view of what this is all about and that’s really 
refashioning the world. 
PROFESSOR WILLIAM NELSON:  I find enormously helpful your 
distinction between scholarship that is written to seek justice and scholarship 
that is written to seek truth.  Both sorts of scholars belong in law schools.  
And I think it makes perfect sense since justice has not been attained over the 
past fifty years to address the truth question about why not.  I have a theory 
about why justice hasn’t happened—that efforts to make it happen were too 
court-centered.  It was a bunch of law professors writing.  Feminist theory is 
much more about legislation than other bodies of reform scholarship, but it 
was still court-centered.  My sense is that most of the issues feminism faces 
are outside the institutional competence of courts, sometimes even outside 
the competence of legislative bodies.  What is needed, and a lot of feminist 
scholarship tried to do it but it was hard, is consciousness-raising.  People 
have to change their way of looking at life and at the world.  And that’s 
something that people who teach in law schools probably aren’t terribly 
effective at writing about and might be something that has to come from 
elsewhere. 
PROFESSOR WEST:  First of all, on Guido’s point about the world 
ignoring scholarship, that’s a lovely, quite romantic vision.  Note how at odds 
it is with the recent way we are judging merit by reference to downloads and 
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impact statements.  As to the move toward interdisciplinarity, I’m not sure 
one can explain the phenomenon entirely by the fact that efforts for justice 
were unsuccessful. 
PROFESSOR NELSON:  I’m not saying entirely, in part. 
PROFESSOR WEST:  In part, yeah.  On the legislation point, you’re 
preaching to the converted.  I’ve been pushing this for thirty years.  I think 
most feminist efforts have been much more explicitly political in the 
traditional sense of targeting legislation than other sorts of reform 
movements, which have been about “let’s reinterpret this or that line of 
precedent.”  On the consciousness-raising stuff, it’s an indispensable. 
PROFESSOR DANIEL COQUILLETTE:  Your analysis was very helpful 
in the trend here that goes through all of this meeting in terms of the search 
for truth as opposed to the search for justice.  First of all, I love this thing 
about downloads.  When I make a remark about federal practice, I get a huge 
number of downloads and letters saying “congratulations,” and I haven’t had 
an original thought in years.  But I have lots of downloads.  One of the big 
problems in writing a major history, like the Harvard Law School history, is 
that there is more to describing an institution than just what happened.  We 
have to at some point make a moral, a social justice evaluation.  Was it good 
or bad?  And that, in turn, means referring to the standards that we have, say, 
to what Roscoe Pound was doing in the 1930s.  So, there is this tension.  On 
the one hand we want to be telling the truth, we want to be doing research 
that establishes the truth.  On the other hand, that’s not enough; we’ve got to, 
at some point, allow our own normative instincts to come out.  How would 
you advise us? 
PROFESSOR WEST:  This is the dilemma we’ve all heard over and over 
again in our meetings.  Historians come in and try to explain the truth of the 
matter, and someone asks, “So, what?  What is your normative judgment 
about all that?”  What you’ve just expressed, I think, is a deeply felt 
conviction in law schools that this is the business we are in—making 
normative judgments.  The project of law is an intrinsically normative 
business.  There is absolutely no question in my mind that the more legal 
historians, economists, philosophers I can recruit to Georgetown the better.  
This is a pitch for pluralism.  But we can’t give up the core of normative 
reasoning in scholarship because that’s where it happens on behalf of justice.  
That’s what the distinctive function of the legal academy is.  If we give it up, 
it’s not coming from anywhere else. 
PROFESSOR KENNETH MACK:  I want to ask about women in law 
schools today.  What does feminist legal theory have to say?  At least at 
Harvard, women get lower grades than men.  You count up the magnas every 
year—very disproportionately men.  Second, the number of women 
professors is shockingly low.  Women law students have been close to 50 
percent for probably close to twenty years, but not faculty.  There are all these 
movements for diversity, all these critiques of the racial aspects of law 
schools, but in terms of gender the critiques are not as strong.  Why not?  
What does feminist legal theory have to say? 
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PROFESSOR WEST:  I feel this personally because my daughter is 
starting law school, and all her first-year teachers are men, except for the 
legal writing person.  Pressure for change will come from students.  
Something is not right in law schools.  Maybe it has to do with who is getting 
called on and how they respond when called on.  You can come up with all 
sorts of ideas, including what a real feminist law school would look like and 
why it would be better for men as well as women.  A big chunk of what is 
accounting for the performance gap is the substance of the law itself. 
